



An Anthology of

Why?

## Edited by Julius Kovesi & Anthony Kenny

Selected and edited by Janet Kovesi Watt

To mark the publication of

Values and Evaluations: Essays in Ethics and Ideology by Julius Kovesi

Edited by Alan Tapper

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# Why? An Anthology

## Introduction

It is now forty years since Julius Kovesi and Anthony Kenny, then postgraduate students at Oxford, introduced Why? to an appreciative public. For such an unpretentious amateur production, which only ran to three issues, its fame was widespread and long-lasting. In later years, Julius Kovesi was more likely to be introduced as the editor of Why? than as the author of Moral Notions, and in 1976 an editorial in Philosophy devoted to philosophical humour gave honourable mention to Why?, produced 'when Professor Julius Kovesi and Dr Anthony Kenny were even younger and friskier than they are today'. A few years later still, in 1982, Dr Kenny delighted an audience in Minnesota by giving a reading of his philosophical parodies of 'Old King Cole' (which first appeared in Why?), aided and abetted by Professor John Dolan, who had composed some additional ones.

As we approach the centenary of the publication (in 1901) of Mind! by F.C.S. Schiller (not to mention the millennium) it seems fitting to publish this album edition of Why? in a more durable form than the original cyclostyled version. Only a very few pieces, which now seem dated, have been left out, but some new material has been included, notably some of Professor Dolan's parodies, as mentioned above, and the philosophical guiz which was submitted by Roland Hall, then of St Andrews, in 1959, and has remained reproachfully in the editor's file ever since.

Why? was neither the first nor the last such journal to be edited by Julius Kovesi. As a schoolboy in Hungary he produced between 1943-44 a student newspaper called FORR A BOR ('The Wine is Fermenting') copies of which still exist, treasured by his friends ever since. Later, in 1970, came Trialogue ('... a journal for the exchange of ideas-for something else') which poked often savage fun at the attitude of the clergy to the changes in religious liturgy and discourse of the time. In Trialogue he put into practice his declaration at the end of the second editorial of Why?: 'There is only one sort of philosophy which we intend to attack: that is, any philosophy, anywhere, which cannot afford to laugh at itself'.

Julius Kovesi's first essay in philosophical humour in the English language was published in 1954, four years after arriving in Australia from Hungary, while he was still a student at the University of Western Australia. This was an entry to a competition in Analysis on 'How can one wish to have been Napoleon?' Since the Analysis competitions are the model for the Why? competitions it seems appropriate to preface this collection with Julius's own essay in the genre.

We hope that this anthology will give pleasure to those who remember the original *Why*?, and whose copies or photocopies may now be somewhat tattered, and make new friends among a new generation of philosophers and students.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

## How Can One Wish to Have Been Napoleon?

#### Julius Kovesi

Does one who wishes to have been Napoleon wish not to be himself? There would be no point in his wish then, for it is *he* who wants to be Napoleon. How is this possible? I am not challenging the impossibility of someone else than Napoleon being Napoleon, but ask: How, in spite of this impossibility one's wish to have been Napoleon is sometimes significant, or sometimes one believes it to be significant, or that others understand the wish.

Is the word 'Napoleon' a name just because it is used more often than not to refer to a person? Words are not names or adjectives, etc., but tools to serve our purposes. And in a special context most words can be used for many different purposes.

'Gardener' is used referentially in the expression 'The gardener looks after the roses', but when I say 'I wish I were a gardener' I may simply wish to look after the roses. The article helps us to see that 'gardener' is not used referentially here. But the grammatical form does not always help us in differentiating between these two uses. In the situation when I see one gardener digging, and another cutting the roses, I may tell my friend, pointing to the second: 'I wish I were *that* gardener', or if we know him 'I wish I were N'. But still these last two expressions are not used to refer to a person, but to an activity. I use 'N' only if my friend also knows him by name. I maintain that the better a person is known in public, and the more he is associated with an activity; the more we are able to use the phrase usually referring to him, to refer to an activity; and the more effective it is. (E.g. Quisling, McCarthy.)

An ambitious cadet reads military history. For him 'I wish to have been Napoleon' means ' If I had had those powers on that particular occasion (or sometimes just in general)!' and then he could go on saying 'I would have done so and so'. He may not mean more than this, for if we reminded him, 'You know he died in exile', he could answer 'I do not mean that'. The similar wish of a politician or law student could be analysed on the same lines. Their wishes involve a physical impossibility, but not a logical one, and their wish is quite legitimate, for it is just this physical 'handicap' that they would like to overcome.

But there could be a logical impossibility involved in the wish, if it is the wish of a person whose ambition is not military



or political, etc., but an ambition to become a 'personality'. What gives plausibility to his wish is that he regards his ambition to be something similar to the ambition of the cadet, etc. To have the military powers of Napoleon can be reconciled with keeping your identity (disregarding the effects of that power on your personality). But to have the personality of Napoleon is not the same as to have his military powers. Only by assuming that it is, do people wish to have his personality. Of course the cadet makes an assumption too; he assumes that without Napoleon's personality he could have that power over his soldiers. But the cadet's mistake is not a logical mistake.

There are persons whose wish to have been Napoleon is of somewhat different sort. Someone may have the development of European history so much at heart that he thinks less of his own life (and still less of Napoleon's) than of a desired different turn in history. For him the wish may be expressed e.g. 'I wish France had not invaded Russia'.

Most of these wishes involve a *naiveté* which is illustrated by this story: The rabbi of Krakow was said to be very wealthy. The rabbi of a small community said that if he were the rabbi of Krakow he would be still wealthier. 'How?', they asked. 'Why, he said, I would keep my own money too.'



## Editorial

The value of Philosophy is to protect us from other Philosophers. But who will protect us from ourselves if we take ourselves too seriously? So here is *Why*? which intends to provide this very important second-order protection. (For our American readers: meta-protection.)

There are two main principles guiding the editing of this magazine.

One is that we won't take nonsense. Still less do we take funny nonsense. For as Bishop Butler said, 'Everything is what it is and not another thing', so nonsense is nonsense, and not even the non-natural quality of funnyness will turn it into wit. Those who would substitute funny nonsense for wit have not got before their minds that object or idea by reference to which *Why*? should be defined. Of course we may fail to live up to this ideal, for in the contingent world of good sense all we can aspire to are opinions.

In an ideal world our second principle would follow deductively from the first, but as things are, it is only contextually implied. This second principle is good taste, i.e. do not write an angry article on your tutor's philosophy just after he has read your report.

These were not descriptive statements but commendatory; alas, they may not describe this first issue of *Why*?.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

The only philosophical work we found on 'editing' was not much help to us. It was Kant's hitherto unpublished treatise, 'The Critique of Practical Editing (Grundlagung)'. Headlines will be true headlines only if they conform to the lines of Reason. So: 'Print only that head-line which you can at the same time will that it should become a headline in all the papers of the Universe that morning.'

We are still awaiting in the Pelican Philosophy Series 'The Language of Editing', where—we hope—it will be argued that the statement 'This is a good headline, and other editors in similar situations should also take this as their headline' is analytic. But we have just received a letter from a Balliol man who now works on the staff of the 'Sunderland Echo', telling us that his Editor is not in quite the same circumstances as the Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald. This empirical statement in conjunction with our analytic statement seems to leave us where we were, and this is why we subscribed to our own Principles.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

We hope to come out again as soon as there is enough material in the Editor's files. Contributions may include articles, critical notices, discussions, book reviews, or you may send your own book for review. In fact *Why*? is just like any other philosophical magazine. We might even consider giving space to articles that the Waynflete Professor could not squeeze into that other philosophical magazine.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

## Why? Competition—First Problem

The first problem is set by J.G.K. of Balliol, and is as follows:

#### 'IS THERE ANY REASON FOR SAYING THAT IN AUSTRALIA THE WINTER IS IN THE SUMMER?'

\* \* \* \* \* \*

## The Bad

It is small wonder that moral philosophers have so far failed to storm the citadel of Ethics, for they have never clearly distinguished between The Wrong and The Bad. And we cannot hope to find even a merely adequate solution to the central problem of Ethics, unless we first clearly define Badness. Several definitions and notions have been suggested by various philosophers, but on closer examination they all turn out to be inadequate. For whatever has been put forward as The Bad cannot be said to be always bad, and so cannot be said to be bad without qualifications. 'Telling the truth' for instance, is not always bad. It is bad if a mad murderer is looking for his victim who is hiding in your room, and you give him away by telling the truth. We may multiply our examples, but still it is clear that 'telling the truth' cannot be said to be always bad.

We may take any of the actions hitherto advocated as bad, and we find that in each case the action in question may in certain circumstances turn out to be good. So these actions cannot be said to be always bad, or, which is the same thing, cannot be said to be bad without qualifications. What we must find is that which is bad without qualifications, or, in other words, bad in itself, that which does not derive its badness from anything else. This is the lowest bad, from which everything else which is bad receives its badness.

We must, if we want to arrive at a correct conclusion, clearly distinguish between two questions. It is because of the confusion of these two questions that moral philosophy has made such small progress towards finding an ultimate foundation of morality. These two questions may be formulated as follows: First, what it is that we ask when we ask whether something ought not to exist for its own sake,\* is bad in itself, or has intrinsic evil; and secondly, exactly what it is that we ask about an action when we ask whether we ought not to do it, whether it is a wrong action?

That which is meant by 'bad', is in fact, except its converse 'good', the *only* simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics. And to the correct analysis of 'bad' I am very anxious to arrive, for if we cannot find the lowest bad, by reference to which all bad can be defined, we may do some good by mistake.

What then is bad? Following Moore, we must first of all point out that 'my business is not with its proper usage, as established by custom. If I wanted that kind of definition I should have to consider in the first place how people generally used the word.'\*\*

Following all except living moral philosophers, we shall find the direction, so to say the general recipe, for the solution of our problem. Reading the standard works on Ethics, we find that there are two and only two distinctions between Ethics and Mathematics.

<sup>\*</sup> It was pointed out to me that we must also distinguish from the question 'What ought not to exist for its own sake?' a further question, namely, 'What, for its own sake, ought not to exist?'

<sup>\*\*</sup> Principia Ethica, p.6. N.B. This is a genuine quotation.

In Mathematics if you cannot find one single foundation for your mathematics, you are not yet a wicked man. But you are a rather wicked man if your Ethics has no *one* foundation and *one* definition.

The other difference is that while in Mathematics it is not the highest number which will serve as the foundation of mathematics and at the same time the criterion by which you distinguish rational from irrational numbers; in Ethics it *is* the highest good which is held to be at the same time the foundation of Ethics and the criterion of right and wrong.

The highest good, however, cannot be the foundation of ethics: since there is nothing higher than the highest nothing can be founded on it, one can only hang things on it. Only the lowest can serve as a foundation, and this is the Imum Malum, the lowest bad, which is bad in itself, bad without qualification, and necessarily and always bad, i.e. simply bad.

How then, can we find that which is always bad? A careful study of the traditional moral philosophy reveals that all we need to do is to classify and re-classify our actions until all the actions within that class are bad. Then we can say of those actions that they are always bad. This classification and re-classification may be achieved by introducing or by excluding motives, results or other circumstances.

It may be objected now that this will not make those actions any worse. 'Telling the truth' is a mixed class of actions, but among the actions so classified we may find some very bad actions indeed, and some very good actions as well. If we happen to be able to re-classify truth-telling so that the good ones are separated from the bad, this re-classification in itself will not make the bad instances of truth-telling any worse.

This objection, however, completely misses the spirit and the great tradition of Moral Philosophy. For we are arguing in the following most ingenious way:

That which is sometimes bad is bad only with qualifications, (i.e. it is in need of reclassification). But that which is always bad (i.e. which is already so classified) is bad without qualifications. Now isn't that which is bad without qualifications worse than that which is bad with qualifications? (At least it sounds so.) Now that which is sometimes bad is not bad in itself. It *receives* its badness from something else. But that which is bad in itself does not receive its badness from anything else. So everything else must receive its badness from it. It will be the lowest bad from which everything else should be deduced, by reference to which morality should be defined, the *Imum Malum* and the foundation of morality.

Those who object to this procedure do not know how to arrive at the greatest misery of the greatest number: they do not know how to arrive at the Kingdom of Dead Ends.

J.G.K.

## The Philosopher's Day

- 8.00 Rise from the Ideal Bed. Look to see if sun has risen.
- 8.15 Place right hand in hot water, left hand in cold water.
- 8.20 Place both hands in lukewarm water.
- 8.25 Half immerse shaving-stick in water and watch it bend. (If the stick melts, buy a neustic.)
- 8.30 Inspect mirror-image and apply Ockham's razor.
- 8.45 Send for the Average Plumber.
- 9.00 Lay table (having first logically constructed it.)
- 9.05 Boil egg and/or watch at 100 degrees centigrade.
- 9.30 Light fire. Consign to it all volumes of divinity or school metaphysics.
- 10.00 Write letters
  - (a) to all your asymmetrical relations;
  - (b) to the present King of France.
- 11.00 Feed the menagerie, viz. the black swans, the tame tigers, unicorns, Fido, carnivorous cows, etc.
- 12.00 Remove ghost from machine.
- 1.00 Lunch, followed by backgammon.
- 2.00 Open window.
- 2.05 Open mind.
- 2.10 Open Mind.
- 2.15 Go for walk. Meet nobody on road. Invite him for drink.
- 3.00 Race tortoise up the High.
- 3.30 Play language-games, Shmakum or other approved recreation.
- At time t. Tea-time. Entertain a proposition.
- 5.00 Introduce Scott to the author of *Waverley*.
- 6.00 Draw picture of nothing noth-ing.
- 6.05 Draw picture of nothing doing.
- 7.00 Cut the pages of Principia Mathematica.
- 8.00 Polish armour in readiness for tomorrow's sea-battle.
- 9.00 Square dance on round table.
- 10.00 Place cat on mat.
- 11.00 Relapse into dogmatic slumber

## Test Your Knowledge (or Opinion)

## A Set of Mind-Teasers

(With *true* answers on page 37) Scoring Instructions: 5 for each fully correct answer. Assessment given with the answers.

- 1. What was the name of Bradley's dog?
- 2. Who invented the word 'scientist', and when?
- 3 Who said, 'If you believe that, you will believe anything'?
- 4. Which 3 empiricist philosophers have at some time held posts at the British Embassy in Paris?
- 5. In which work of Rousseau does the phrase 'noble savage' (or, if you like, its French equivalent) occur?
- 6. What scientist admitted that reading Hume decisively furthered his thinking on the 'central point' of his most important theory?
- 7. What philosopher was assassinated?
- 8. What influential logician became a pope?
- 9. Who first used ' $\Pi$ ' and ' $\Sigma$ ' as quantifiers and called them 'quantifiers'?
- 10. Who said 'We must begin by recognising the distinctions made by ordinary language'?
- 11. By what name could the philosophy papers in Greats be called, until 1903?
- 12. Name 3 philosophers who spent some time in prison.
- 13. Who was going to write the 4th volume of *Principia Mathematica*, and on what subject?
- 14. Where is the earliest formulation of the Empiricist Principle to be found?
- 15. Who told the story of the two lions who one night quarrelled so ferociously that in the morning only their tails were found in the cage?
- 16. Who is supposed to have described what as 'the night in which all cows are black'?
- 17. Who wrote: 'entium varietates non temere esse minuendas'?
- 18. Who told the story of the Siamese king who refused to believe in ice?
- 19. Name an Austrian trained in engineering and philosophy, who wrote novels.
- 20. Who pointed out that dogs use the principle 'If either A or B or C, but not A or B, then C'?

R.H.

## Teach Yourselves Philosophers

#### (An Alexandrian Guide to What the Cultured Man should know.)

In the civilized world of the third century Alexandrians, the dilettante reigned supreme. A ready knowledge of the Greek Philosophers was needful in this society which counted it good taste to sip elegantly from the cup of each Muse. (An exception was poor Thalia who, as patroness of public festivals and pastoral poets, was a shade too lower-class; hence the phrase which denotes going to excess, 'One over the Eight').

Yet however much we may dislike such a society where no-one read but everyone quoted, we are indebted to such of their diarists as have survived for important facts of much greater men.\* But not enough note has been taken by any modern editor of the help accorded to us by one of the brighter Alexandrian sparks, CLERIHEUS of BOUGEPHURA. He was an academic of some standing—we have his own word for this—and a surviving edition of the Alexandrian HOS EST HOS mentions his published works as some articles in a magazine known as AKOUSIOS, and a verse guide to philosophy for his pupils. It is this that is published for the first time.

He makes it clear that the two Zenos are not to be confused, and to prevent this gaffe he writes:

Zeno the Eleatic Is rather problematic But more heroic Than Zeno the Stoic.

Each has a verse to himself however.

Zeno

Made rather a poor showing at Beano: But as a problem-setter Shaped better.

While for a Cynic's view of the first Stoic, he gives us

How do we know That Zeno The Stoical founder Wasn't a bounder? Next comes a comparison of a Cynic and an Ionian:

Diogenes Suffered from podginess But he still had slimmer knees Than Anaximenes.

This must be Diogenes the Cynic who suffered from lack of exercise in his barrel. But he had two namesakes.

> Diogenes the Babylonian Thought he was the only one And he regarded Diogenes of Crete As a cheat.

What of the remaining Ionian philosophers?

Thales bet That all things were wet, In fact the wetter The better.

> Anaximander Though renowned for his candour, Yet eschewed Being rude.

> > When asked what the basis Of the human race is, Pure and demure Fire, says the Obscure.

It must by now be clear that a new estimate of this man, who so blindingly delineates the great men of Greek thought, must be made. Nor let it be forgotten that although his life was devoted to conversational success, Cleriheus died nobly enough with the quip on his lips: 'Don't forget we owe Asclepius a cocktail.'

Trust him to find a new twist.

R.C.S.W.

<sup>\*</sup> For the full tale of these, with reference to philosophy, see Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (vol. IV) available at 175 shillings. (A most handsome binding)

## **Book Review**

#### The Language of Courtship, by Mr. Alvis, pp.180. 18s.

This book, written with admirable clarity, is a most welcome contribution to Oxford Philosophy. The need for this work was long felt, and at last Mr Alvis's book fills this gap in the most successful way. This book must have a place on the shelves of all undergraduates, and it is certainly indispensable for those who need it.

The book divides itself into three parts, the third part being an analytic model in which Mr. Alvis tries to establish an analytic connection between sentences of the form 'She is a nice girl' and 'He loves her'. This is the least successful part of the work, which will not, however, diminish its value, nor its importance.

Those who find the first half of the work difficult to follow may read it in the reverse order, and when they thus accept the conclusions, will find it easier to accept the steps leading up to the conclusion.

The first part of the book delimits the general class of statements that are used in courtship, and the value of the argument lies in the distinction between indicatives and expressions of love. The examples given are:

- i. He will marry her.
- ii. He loves her.

The translations Mr Alvis offers for this indicative and expression of love, respectively, are:

- i. His marrying this girl in the immediate future, yes.
- ii. His marrying this girl in the immediate future, please.

Next, indicatives and propositions are discussed in connection with the word 'nice'. That a girl is nice is the best indicative to the fact that she is a good proposition. This discussion of propositions serves at the same time as a natural introduction to proposing.

The second part of this most admirable work is devoted to pointing out that it is impossible to say that two girls are exactly the same in every respect, except that the one is nice and the other is not nice. While this is impossible to say, what we *must* say is that if he loves her, everybody else in similar situations ought to love her.—Obvious embarrassments are avoided by not mentioning proper names.

A short review like this cannot do full justice to all the problems discussed in *The Language of Courtship*. No doubt others will argue that a book like this will corrupt the youth. But we can safely recommend this small volume to all undergraduates, both male and female.

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## Editorial

The Greeks told us that a philosopher is one who loves wisdom; the French say that 'on se moque de ce qu'on aime'; it follows that the true philosopher is one who laughs at wisdom. Once again, therefore, *Why*? appears in order to perform its self-appointed task of seasoning the rare meat of philosophy with the salt of wit.

Certain of our readers have misinterpreted the aims of *Why*?. Some of the articles contained in our first issue led some people to conclude that *Why*?was a manifesto against 'Oxford Philosophy'. As well conclude, from the verses which we printed about Thales and Anaximander, that we were launching a campaign against the pre-Socratics.

As Professor Ryle would put it, we are not interested in claims to Fuehrership in philosophy. As the same eminent philosopher said at Royaumont: 'Claims to Fuehrership end when post-prandial joking begins'. Our aim is merely to trigger off the post-prandial joking.

There is only one sort of philosophy which we intend to attack: that is, any philosophy, anywhere, which cannot afford to laugh at itself. Philosophers of this kind, alas, are not likely to come across *Why*?; but if any do so, we cannot do better than remind them of the dictum of the Master: 'WHEREAT ONE CANNOT LAUGH, THEREOF ONE MUST BEWARE.'

\* \* \* \* \* \*

Schopenhauer claimed that all humour can be 'traced to syllogism in the first figure with an undisputed major and an unexpected minor, which to a certain extent is only sophistically valid'.

## 'Is There any Reason for Saying that in Australia the Winter is in the Summer?'

Report on Why? Competition-Problem No.1

About one third of the entries were of high standard. None of them, however, to my regret, tried out a possible avenue of solution: regarding 'winter' in Australia as a referring expression, uttered by a speaker in Australia (i.e. 'this season') and 'summer' in England—uttered by the same speaker—as a description (i.e. 'while such and such is going on in England'). One would then be interested to know how one should regard this expression when it is uttered by someone in England. Would in this case 'winter' and 'summer' exchange their respective roles; one being a 'referring' expression and the other a 'description', i.e. would 'this season' be replaced by 'that season' in the referring part of the statement?

The two best entries are printed here. They divide between themselves the first place. They took different lines of approach. Miss Carboch lays emphasis on empirical verification, while Mr. Sturch analyzes the logic of 'Australia-statements'. Miss Carboch did not seem to make a distinction between 'winter *is* summer' and 'winter is *in* summer'. And Mr. Sturch has an unfortunate turn in his conclusion. I cannot see why after his penetrating analysis of 'Australia-statements' he regards the problem as a 'purely empirical question'.

#### I.a. by Miss Dagmar Carboch

Yes. All people who have lived in Australia and then find themselves in England in the season which in this country is referred to as 'summer' will testify that all empirical criteria of what Englishmen call 'summer', namely temperature, amount of sunshine, etc., are perfectly satisfied by what Australians call 'winter'. Hence it follows that what Australians call 'winter' is in the Queen's English called 'summer', or, in other words, in Australia the winter is in the summer.

Some people are given to the belief that in Australia the seasons are reversed in the sense that though in both countries summer follows after spring and winter after autumn, the English summer is simultaneous with the Australian winter, and the English spring with the Australian autumn. I propose to explain what makes even sensible and rational people subscribe to this fantastic and obviously false thesis. Its originators are travellers who, having e.g. set out from Australia on the onset of winter and found themselves in England after a four weeks' journey by sea, or a four days' journey by air, discover that suddenly, instead of it still being winter it is summer already. Instead of concluding correctly that what in England is called 'summer' is in Australia called 'winter', they are led to the absurd belief that in the two countries the seasons are reversed. Moreover, their testimony is taken seriously by many non-travellers who, without this 'empirical verification', would never accept the hypothesis. It is clear, however, as all Einsteinians will agree, that such an extraordinary journey cannot but play havoc with the traveller's clock, so that he gets quite confused about how much time has elapsed on earth while he has spent what seemed like four days in the air or four weeks at sea. Lady Margaret Hall

#### I.b. by Mr. L. Sturch

The fundamental error underlying this alleged problem is that of imagining that the question 'Is there any reason for saying that in Australia the winter is in the summer?' has the same logic as 'Is there any reason for saying that in France frogs are esteemed as food?' It is a mistake to suppose that the name 'Australia' has the same logical grammar as 'France', 'Switzerland', 'Siberia', 'Rutlandshire' or 'North Dakota'. It is no more like such names than 'Utopia', 'Erewhon' or 'Ruritania' are. It is not sense to say 'In Ruritania the population is increasing' *unless* you are playing a language-game in which it is stipulated that Ruritania is 'a real place' (to use the material mode). Now it is clear that 'Australia' is *not* a real place; or better, that the word 'Australia' is not a name. The words 'in Australia' are used simply to signify that the contradictory of what is stated to be the case 'in Australia' is in fact the case. Thus we say 'In Australia there are mammals that lay eggs' (meaning that there are none in reality); 'In Australia there are black swans' (meaning that all real swans are some other colour); 'In Australia people who stand upright have their heads pointing downwards' (meaning that this is self-contradictory). The supposed problem is thus reduced to 'Is there any reason for saying that the winter is not in the summer?', a purely empirical question to which we may venture the answer 'No'.

Christ Church

\* \* \* \* \* \*

## Second Why? Competition

The Second Why? competition is set by J.G.K. of Balliol and is as follows:

#### 'DOES THIS PROBLEM ENTAIL THAT THERE EXISTS AT LEAST ONE PROBLEM?'

### FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

#### Lecture List for Michaelmas Term 1958

Subject	Lecturer	Place
Can Tomorrow precede Yesterday?	Mr. M.A.E. Dummett	Schools
Pride and Predicates	Professor J.L. Austin	Northanger Abbey
Satan	Mr. A.M. Quinton	Blackfriars
British Philosophy before 1900 (One lecture only)	Mr. G.J. Warnock	Folly Bridge
Existentialist Meta- phenomenology	Mr. C. Taylor	Rive Gauche
Bits and Buts	Professor J.L. Austin	Here, there & everywhere
What Plato did not say (for visiting Americans only)	Mr. G.E.L. Owen	Corpus Christi Library
Problems in recent French Philosophy	Professor Ryle	Café de Paris
Family Likenesses	Mr. P.T. Geach & Miss G.E.M. Anscombe	27 St. John St.
On Brute Animals, with reference to Evil	Mr P.T. Geach	Whipsnade Zoo
The Theory of Morals as a tool for the Gamester	Professor Braithwaite	Monte Carlo
What I said on the B.B.C. (Any number of lectures)	Mr. E. Gellner	(To be arranged)
The Private World	Mr. S. Hampshire	(Privileged access only)

## Startling New Manuscript Discovery

#### K\*\*b\*nsky does it again

Professor K\*\*b\*nsky has added to his record of discovery. His latest bag is a note in the hand of the late A.E. Taylor, in which the eminent scholar argues that *Principia Ethica* is a humorous work. News of this has of course provoked controversy. The attitude of the opposition, led by Professor Ryle, is summed up in his gruff clipped utterance: 'If this was a joke, it wouldn't have taken Taylor to see it'. We are permitted to quote a part of Taylor's note:

This hypothesis both 'throws' a great deal of 'light' on the work, and is 'supported' by many passages. The only argument I know against it is that *Principia Ethica* is a 'serious' work. But this argument is based on an unreal opposition between 'seriousness' and 'humour'. The greater the 'humour' the greater the 'seriousness' at a 'level' which we may consider 'deeper', a point noted by both Al-gazel and a less 'well-known' authority Melancthon. No one can deny that in the following passage Moore is positively 'rollicking':

'When, therefore, we say that murder is in general to be avoided, we only mean that it is so, so long as the majority of mankind will certainly not agree to it, but will persist in living. And that, under those circumstances, it is generally wrong for any single person to commit murder seems capable of proof. For, since there is in any case no hope of exterminating the race, the only effects which we have to consider are those which the action will have upon the increase of the goods and the diminution of the evils of human life. Where the best is not attainable (assuming extermination to be the best) one alternative may still be better than another. And apart from the immediate evils which murder generally produces, the fact that, if it were a common practice, the feeling of insecurity thus caused, would absorb much time, which might be spent to better purpose, is perhaps conclusive against it.' (*Principia Ethica*, pp.156-7).

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* 'OUR DEBT TO GREECE AND ROME' Originally . . . 7/6 NOW . . . . 2/6 Notice in Oxford Bookshop.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

At a party, a don was overhead to say: "Look, there is Mr. Str\*\*s\*n!. You know, it's fantastic, everything he says is true!"

## Variations on a Theme

We print below ten analyses, by various distinguished philosophers alive and dead, of the following simple sentence:

Old King Cole was a merry old soul A merry old soul was he He called for his pipe and he called for his bowl And he called for his fiddlers three.

#### Analysis One: by David Hume

'Tis universally allow'd, that the Ebullition of the Animal Spirits, and the desire for Tobacco and the Recreation of the Muse, may be found in constant Attendance, the one upon the other. The history of this gregarious Monarch will thus occasion no surprise to those who are versed in the Customs and Civilities of the remote Age in which he liv'd. But the Insinuation, that this conduct was Occasion'd by some mysterious Power or Energy in his Soul, savours more of Sophistry and gross Delusion than of just Reasoning or sound Philosophy. Whence, I beseech you, have we acquired the Idea of this Subtle Force? Indeed, we are got in to Fairy Land; and there we know not whether we may trust Reason or Rime.

#### A.J.P.K.

#### Analysis Two: by Aristotle

Aware that virtue is achievement of the mean, the King, concerned with honour and excellence more than with pleasure as befits a great-souled man, strives to temper his desires in accordance with the mean. It is plain that to desire no pipe at all is to desire too few and, thus, a vice of deficiency, and that to desire ten is to desire too many and, thus, a vice of excess. It does not follow that achievement of the mean consists in calling for five pipes, since the mean at which virtue aims is not an arithmetical mean among things in themselves, but, rather, in each case, the mean relative to ourselves. Thus, when the King calls for exactly one pipe, he achieves the mean. After this accomplishment, however, his discipline fails, for to demand but one bowl is a clear instance of the vice of defect, and to request three fiddlers, an unmistakable case of the vice of excess.

J.M.D.

#### Analysis Three: by Bertrand Russell

- (a) It is not always false of x that if x is aged and x is royal and x is called Cole then x is merry and x is aged and x is a soul. Whatever y is, if y is aged and y is royal and y is called Cole then y is x.
- (b) Encore.
- (c) For any x, if x is Cole's pipe, or x is Cole's bowl, or x is Cole's fiddler, then Cole called for x. And whatever w and y and z are if w is a fiddler and y is a fiddler and z is a fiddler then w isn't y and y isn't z and z isn't w.
- (d) Phew.

A.J.P.K.

#### Analysis Four: by Noam Chomsky

This passage is immediately intelligible to any native speaker of English. That it has been circulated in various popular children's anthologies does not account for the ease and immediacy of our grasp of it. Even speakers for whom it is a wholly novel sequence of words (the usual case in normal language use) recognize it as correctly formed and understand it immediately. It is composed of familiar words organized in accordance with the grammatical rules internalized by mature speakers of English.

The tacit suggestion that Cole's commands and other utterances are to be explained as conditioned responses reinforced by pipes, bowls, fiddlers and other pleasurable stimuli is empty and absurd. Even more absurd is the claim skilfully insinuated here that Cole's highly centralized, top-down authoritarian kingdom is a source of merriment and human well-being. It is hardly surprising that the Mandarin mentality which portrays the whims of a monarch so favourably should omit mention of the numerous violations of human rights under Cole's brutally repressive regime (documented at length in my book, *The Bright Man's Burden: The Responsibility of Intellectuals Under Merry Monarchs*).

J.M.D.

#### Analysis Five: by Otto Neurath

Cole's protocol at 5:15 p.m. Jan. 1st BC / Cole's speech-thought at 5:14 p.m. Jan. 1st BC was (Age, now; joy, now; craving for nicotine, now; fiddlers three, here, now or at any rate pretty damn quick).

A.J.P.K.

#### Analysis Six: by John Wisdom

When alls said and done this is a pretty rum sort of sentence I mean isnt it dammit. Not just that it isnt punctuated because Ive never been very much of a one for punctuation myself but I mean all this stuff about pipes and bowls makes you feel theres something in what Freud says or is it Kafka about the unseen whisper and the silent rainbow breaking through the unswept corridor where wanders all forlorn the spastic metaphysician hunting through his pockets for a ticket to the life to come. Who knows?

A.J.P.K.

A.J.P.K.

#### Analysis Seven: by Rudolph Carnap

The first part of the sentence is misleading because it may deceive us into thinking that Old King Cole was a merry old pseudo-object whereas in fact he was a merry old thingword. The latter part of the sentence is patient of analysis as 'Cole uttered in -L sentences which were intentionally isomorphic to the English sentences "Fetch me my pipe", "Fetch me my bowl" and "Fetch me my fiddlers three".'

Analysis Eight: by W.V. Quine

Happily, the exercise of providing an analysis of this passage does not in any manner commit us to the uncritical supposition that there is some uniquely correct gloss for which we're searching. That supposition, with its attendant museum myth and lingering dalliance with the misconceived analytic/synthetic distinction, has long since been discredited, if not by actual reasoned argument then at least by repeated sneering. There are a transfinite number of incompatible analytical hypotheses equally in accord with Cole's dispositions to respond overtly to publicly observable sensory stimulations. Convenience and the purpose at hand play a large role in our selection among these competing hypotheses.

Every piece of evidence that Cole called for his pipe is equally good evidence that Cole called for a temporal slice of his pipe or for a collection of undetached pipe parts. The assumption that Cole called for a macroscopic temporally enduring pipe has neither more nor less in its favour than the hypothesis that he summoned the gigantic scattered object whose parts are all the pipes scattered through space and time: the pipe-fusion. (Does anyone have a temporal slice of a match?)

J.M.D.

#### Analysis Nine: by John Rawls

A thorough examination of this rhyme demands investigating whether the distribution of pipes, bowls and fiddlers within King Cole's kingdom satisfies the basic requirements of justice. Such an investigation is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Here, we will examine King Cole's command itself. He is asking for his pipe, bowl, and three fiddlers. Is this an unstructured command? Not at all. He is asking for pipe, bowl and fiddlers in that order. To be precise, he is asking for these things in that *lexicographical order*. Thus, a response to his command which brought him two bowls and six fiddlers but no pipe would be valued by Cole below a response which brought him his pipe but no bowls or fiddlers. This is a standard feature of lexicographic orderings. In reflective equilibrium, one recognizes that bowls and fiddlers are worth damn little if one hasn't got one's pipe.

J.M.D.

#### Analysis Ten: by Gilbert Ryle

For all its air of Monday-morning-ness, this sentence contains at least one expression which may give rise to puzzlement. A soul can be neither merry nor unmerry, neither old nor young, any more than a straight flush can be either a leg-break or an off-break. Merriness, for instance, is not a twitch, tweak, spasm, tingle or quirk which one could date, or time, or expect or repeat. Does the poem imply that the fiddlers, pipe and bowl were in fact forthcoming? I think not: 'call' is not a success verb, but a hit-or-miss verb, a take-it-or-leave-it verb.

A.J.P.K.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

## **Brief** Notice

A New State Movement: Central State Materialism by Julius Kovesi University of East Indian Ocean

This is a brilliant confusion between politics and psychology, a study of Philosophy in Mid-Australia where A.J. Ayer provided the foundation of a New State suitably in the shape of a Rock. Mr Kovesi argues that Ayer's Rock is the Foundation of Central State Materialism.

'The Appearance of this book puts all Reality behind.'

Phenomenological Review

'Provides new material for the History of Ideas. One wonders where Mr Kovesi got his ideas from".

Journal of the History of Ideas

## Second Public Examination

#### Honour School of Philosophy

#### PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

(Candidates are recommended to answer at least none of these questions).

- 1. 'Nothing is more instructive than philosophy' (Spinoza). Is this a good reason for reading nothing?
- 2. Who stood whom on whose head?
- 3. Which would you rather be: (a) a ghost in the machine; (b) a spectre haunting the critical fields of Europe; (c) an animal spirit; (d) a brute fact?
- 4. What reason is there for believing that Thales had spent a summer in England?
- 5. Distinguish between the Concept of Mind and the content of Mind.
- 6. Where did Plato get his Ideas from?
- 7. Compare and contrast: (a) What Aristotle says about Wisdom.

(b) What Wisdom says about Aristotle.

- 8. Who won the Ontological Argument?
- 9 Are swear-word performatory utterances or parenthetical verbs? (Give examples.)
- 10. How many more things are there in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy? (Give a rough estimate).
- 11. What evidence is there that Aristotle had read Ross?
- 12. What evidence is there that Ross had read Aristotle?
- 13. Do self-service shops serve themselves in the same way as self-refuting expressions refute themselves?
- 14. 'Gellner is a paradigm case of a linguistic philosopher'. Discuss.
- 15. Are but-s constitutionally bitty?
- 16. Are if-s constitutionally uncanny?



## Editorial

In our second Editorial we disclaimed the absurd notion of some that we are out to ridicule the establishment. Since then *Why*? has become part of the establishment. Readers may remember the end of George Orwell's "Animal Farm". The animals succeeded in their revolution under the leadership of pigs. Then the pigs began trading with the neighbouring farmers, and established cultural relations with them. Once when the neighbouring farmers were entertained by the pigs, the other animals looked in through the window, and what they saw bewildered them. For they could not distinguish the pigs from the farmers any more.

Some of our readers tell us that they cannot distinguish between *Why*? and other philosophical journals. Another letter goes further and claims that *Why*? is the best journal going. So *Why*? is here to stay.

Many readers complain that Why? is not readily available for their students, and that sometimes they have to search specialists' libraries for references. For this reason we intend to publish the most influential articles that have appeared or are appearing in Why? in a separate volume under the title Why And Language, Vol. 1. We intend to include in this volume some hitherto unpublished articles as well, and contributions are most welcome.

Contributions may be sent either to the Oxford or to the Edinburgh editors. Requests for reprints of back numbers should be sent to Edinburgh where *Why*? is now published. (Not even in this are we behind *Mind*.)

We said in our first Editorial that the value of philosophy is to protect us from other philosophers. One of our readers corrected us by saying: 'The value of philosophy is to be able to understand Why?'.

## 'Does This Problem Entail That There Exists At Least One Problem?'

Report on Why? Competition-Problem No. 2

There have been only two entries this time, both from Oxford. This may be due to the fact that the Problem was published in the summer when people take a holiday from problems.

Neither of the entries discussed the notion of entailment. Does this problem *entail*, or *generate* at least one problem? The vanishing of the problem was rightly emphasised by Mr. Hunt. And—as he says—if the problem whether there *was* a problem also vanishes, we don't know what to say. This is why I set the problem.

Here is the winning entry:

Which problem? Presumably, the problem to which 'this problem' refers. But this seems to be the problem whether there is a problem. For if there is a problem, then the existence of at least one problem will be entailed by it. But is there a problem whether there is a problem? If there is, then there is (at least one) problem, so there isn't a problem whether there is a problem. But *this* was supposed to be the problem. So perhaps the problem is: if there is a problem, is this it? Is this a problem?

Suppose we try saying: Well, I feel puzzled, so there must be a problem. (Compare saying: 'I feel let down, so there must be a deception'). Is the problem (deception) there because I think it is? Or better: Is there a problem (deception) because I think there is?

Nor will it do to say: The solution is seen in the vanishing of the problem. For suppose our problem vanishes. Then we are left with the problem; was there a problem?—'Well, there was, but it vanished'. How does this help us? And if *this* problem vanished too, we should not know *what* to say.

Philosophical problems have the form: 'What can I say next?' Now I feel inclined to say; Yes, there is a problem whether or not there is a problem. And do not say: It makes no difference how you take this sentence.

Ivor Hunt Christ Church

## Third Why? Competition

### IF A MACHINE TELLS YOU: 'I SHALL COME BACK TO FINISH THOSE CAL-CULATIONS FOR YOU', THEN GOES AWAY AND DOES NOT RETURN, DID IT BREAK A PROMISE OR DID IT BREAK DOWN?

\* \* \* \* \* \*

Drinking and Dreaming

The problem of the Infernal World has been traditionally misunderstood by philosophers in two quite different ways. It has either been thought of as a problem of constructing Public Houses entirely out of private bars, (a thing that no one but a snob would wish to do) or thought of as a problem of making a substantial liquid out of the neutral stuff provided by the landlord. But there are three fatal objections to all these theories. In the first place if any thing were given by the landlord this would be a sensation. Secondly all these theories assume that there must be gaps between real drinks which have to be filled by non-potent potibilia, which, they say, can only be introduced by means of a transcendental argument with the bar-tender. But there is no need for any argument: the stuff can be poured straight from the bottle. It is not its existence but its quality which is dubious. Thirdly no one has ever given any satisfactory reason why there should be any gaps between drinks at all.

The reason most commonly advanced is called the Argument from Illusion; but people who make use of this argument always get themselves into a gratuitous mess and often into the Vine Street Police Court as well. The whole thing can be cleared up by paying proper attention to the nuances of the English language. It is true that arguments often proceed from illusions; but we must, as always, be careful to speak of 'illusions', not 'Illusion'. Indeed, in the circumstances it is better not to try to speak at all. The right method would be this: To wait till someone tries to do something physical and then throw him out. If it is after closing time he will probably require a ladder to get out with. But when he has climbed out, over, through or under the bar, he must be careful not to throw the ladder away, as he will probably need it for climbing into College. The proper way to deal with the problem is to tackle each illusion separately on its merits. If we do this, we find that the ordinary language of English abuse is sufficient to cope with it. I propose, therefore, to examine only one of the questions that philosophers commonly confuse by about ten o'clock: 'when I see two pink elephants, what is it that I have had too much of?' It is obvious that bar-tenders, bar-maids, police-sergeants, police-surgeons, alienists and even aliens have no difficulty in answering this question. The police-surgeon may, indeed, have to make use of the argument from inconstancy and incoherence in order to put the correct logical construction on the succession-indifferent steps of the drunkard. But the ordinary customer has no need of any argument to tell him what to do.

In this respect the customer is on all-fours with the bar-maid. She too has no need for occult ingredients with which to mix a Manhattan or a Mickey Finn. Hypothetical propositions about what you could or would do after another glass of port cut no ice with her; nor should her unstudied chat be constructed as an interference-licence. Some people even confuse 'could', 'would' and 'should'. But while the first refers to the capacity of the customer, the second simply means that the stuff is non-vintage. Questions about what you should do after several more glasses very seldom arise but have to be swept up in the morning. All these questions should be sharply distinguished from the mongrel-imperative statement, 'You know what you can do with it', which is properly applied only to the Mild and Bitter served up at the Buridan's Ass.

I will not weary the reader with any more specific questions, such as 'What's yours?' and 'Say when?'. These can be very easily answered, though the former should be answered much more quickly than the latter. There are however some questions which, coming from certain sources, render one speechless. For example, 'What would you say if I were to offer you a drink?'.

Multiple Appearances play a part in many theories. *Things* should never be allowed to multiple-appear until very late in the evening; but *people* may and *drinks* should appear as frequently as possible. Drinks, by the way, should never be taken *from* a place, unless the place has an off-licence. Drinks are clockable, though the clock is always fast. Drinks are taken at a place, but they may be digested, dwelt on, regurgitated or regretted from a place to a place, for example from the Cretan Liar to the Unshaven Barber. What the drinker does between his multiple appearances will depend on the sex of the other symposiasts and the phase of the moon.

Kant seems to have thought that a public house can be apprehended indifferently from the roof or the cellar or even taken in the rear after hours. This was all very well for Kant who was well-known to the local police. But there is no need to walk all round the house at all. The beginner is advised to make straight for the bar during hours. At other times he must obtain privileged access to what goes in the cellar.

Pub-crawls are sometimes called Objective Successions, since it makes a great deal of difference which order you take them in. The Object is always not to be caught north of Folly Bridge at ten-thirty. This is because different imbibence-licences are in force in different counties. It is an illicit process to pass from a potation in Berkshire to one in Oxfordshire and this is only done *per accidens*.

## Aphorisms

- 2.02 The Object is simple.
- 2.032 Roughly speaking, gin and water is colourless.
- 5.44 Not what the stuff is, is the mystery, but how they manage to sell it.
- 6.521 The solution to the problem of life is seen in the bottom of the tankard. (Is this not the reason why men to whom after long drinking the sense of life became clear could not say wherein it consisted?)
- 6.522 There is indeed the inexpressible; this shows itself; it is the Port Type.
- 7. Wherefore one cannot pay, thereof must one not drink.
- 6.01/2 Skin off your nose.
- 10.30 Time, gentlemen, please.

P.N-S.

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* Wisemanship

The study of Lifemanship in philosophy is of very ancient origin. Aristotle's *Topics* is the oldest handbook on the subject which we possess, though the discovery of the cardinal principle of philosophical lifemanship ('never give an answer if you have a chance to ask a question instead') is attributed to Socrates. Aristotle's own best work was done in the limited field of Thirdmanship.

If the student will take the trouble to master a few simple ploys, he may be assured of victory in philosophical discussion without ever being put to the pains of learning any philosophy. The first move learnt by beginners is, of course, the Triviality Gambit, which consists merely in following the rule that one should never contest the truth of what one's interlocutor maintains, but suggest that his position, while true, is trivial. This move is now losing its popularity since the discovery of the Austin defence, first used at South-

ampton in 1958. This consists in a bland utterance of the words 'I am not sure whether importance is important. Truth is.'

Other, more subtle manoeuvres are therefore to be brought into play. A delicate and satisfactory tactic is the Redefinition Charge. This can be used in a wide variety of situations. Thus, if one's opponent has triumphantly established that a certain word means what he has all along maintained it did mean, one should not contest his argument, but rather nod sagely while saying 'Yes, I see, one could define the word in such a way as to make it mean what you want it to mean. But what does *our* word mean?'.

Perhaps the most effective way of countering an argument which one cannot answer is to associate it, by a gentle turn of phrase, with other arguments which are commonly felt to be disreputable. There are at least three ways of doing this. Suppose, for example, that someone has said 'But dammit, if I feel a pain, I *have* a pain', it is unwise to contest this statement. One should rather adopt one of the following courses, such as giving his argument a name beginning with capital letters, saying, for example, 'So you believe in Privileged Access, do you?' Or one may insinuate that one's adversary is following a party line, thus: 'I see you are a Naive Realist'. Or one may father his argument on some philosopher of whom he would not approve, murmuring, as it might be, 'Yes, I know Heidegger *said* that, but do you think he proved his point?'.

In arguments connected with the history of philosophy, an ever-popular ploy is the Allusion to Unpublished Works. It is hardly necessary to point out that in order to use this manoeuvre it is not required that the student should actually *read* the unpublished works of any philosopher. It is enough that he should master a few simple sentences such as 'But surely in his letters to Husserl Frege says that Sinn and Bedeutung mean exactly the same?' or 'I gather the wartime notebooks make it clear that the text should read 'Whereof one cannot keep silent, thereof one must speak". Unfortunately the publication of the Blue and Brown Books has somewhat restricted the field in which this tactic can be used with success.

A slightly cheap, but not unprofitable, form of argument is the Refutation by Anecdote. This calls for a certain amount of imagination, but no actual research. When faced, for example, with a line of argument derived from Kant, it may often prove that the only safe reply is to say 'You know, the second antimony always reminds me of that killingly funny story about the time Kant knocked a pint of bitter over a barmaid in Baden'. What particular anecdote to tell is best left to the student's individual judgement and repertoire. It takes very little talent to change a story about Pat and Mike walking down Broadway into a logion concerning Socrates and Theaetetus on their way to the Piraeus.

## A New Museum

Visitors to Oxford should make a point of inspecting the University Museum of the History of Philosophy. Built on an excellent plot of non-natural property, this Museum lacks only the quality of existence to make it the most perfect of its kind in the world.

Entering the building a priori, the visitor passes into a fine round quadrangle (T. Hobbes, arch.) in the centre of which stands the majestic tree of Porphyry, somewhat decayed through the course of the centuries but still cared for (so the curator will tell you) through the good offices of an invisible gardener. Beneath this, and almost hidden, is Thales' well, into which American visitors are allowed to fall on payment of a fee of five shillings. A serving-maid is in constant attendance.

The massive Entrance Hall is decorated by strips of marble arranged in a geometrical pattern. The geometry is analytic, the marble undoubtedly synthetic. Two imposing frescoes commemorate memorable events in the history of philosophy. That on the left depicts Achilles congratulating the first tortoise to run a four-minute mile, while that on the right—intentionally isomorphic to its counterpart—gives a dramatic rendering of Sir Walter Scott being introduced to the author of *Waverley*.

The mechanical section is perhaps the most interesting part of the Museum. Occam's original razor stands opposite a self-reproducing machine which can be programmed either to multiply entities or to operate as a felicific calculator. Visitors may also inspect the telescope which was used by Frege in his studies of the moons of Venus, the Morning Star, the Evening Star and other astronomical figures. One of the most engaging exhibits is a clockwork dog bequeathed to the curators by M. Descartes. There is an interesting set of working models of epicycles, elliptical penny-farthings etc., the gift of Lord Nuffield.

Even those most pressed for time should not fail to visit the bizarre Meinong Room, also known as Valhalla. An order of round square pillars runs round the room, each bearing the Meinong crest (a chimaera passant gardant proper on a mountain or). Among the exhibits housed here may be seen a hexagonal triangle coloured red and green all over, a rich variety of unperceived sense-data, and a fine collection of Homeric gods. A large amount of property bequeathed by Plato is temporarily housed in this room pending resystematisation.

Readers will not need to be urged to take the opportunity to admire the Ayeux tapestry which records in intricate detail every stage of the Argument from Illusion. Particularly fine sequences are those which commence 'HIC. ADALPHRIDUS. PROFESSOR. PONIT. BACULUM. IN. AQUA. SED. AUGUSTINUS. PROFESSOR. NON.

#### DECIPITUR.' AND 'HIC. REX. MACBETHIUS. VIDIT. PUGIONEM. NON-EXISTENTEM. LAETATUR. ADALPHRIDUS.'

Among the many interesting manuscripts which may be seen we have space to single out only a few. The death certificate of the Duke of Wellington is on show, countersigned by John Stuart Mill. So too is a hitherto unpublished private diary in which Wittgenstein recorded the occurrence of the sensation E, also an early draft of the *Tractatus* which shows that as originally planned the book had a happy ending. Unfortunately these exhibits have to be examined by artificial light, since they are stored in the Leibniz room which is, of course, windowless.

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## Letter to the Editor

To the Editor Why?

Dear Sir,

In the article entitled 'A New Museum' which appeared in your edition of February 1959, I observed that the beholder of the non-existent dagger was referred to as 'Rex Macbethius'. This is riddled with philosophical problems. Either the king is Duncan (not yet murdered) or Macbeth is the king. If the latter, Macbeth has no need of the dagger, which renders probable its non-existence but leaves the problem of why Macbeth saw it. If the former, one of two things. Macbeth may have only the *quality* of being king, or Duncan can be identified with Macbeth. Or is one to resort to the supposition that Macbeth was king only in a Kingdom of Ends? (Duncan's?)

> I am, Sir, Your Obedient Servant, WDC

> > Magdalen College Oxford

## Brush Up Your Word Power

Is your philosophical vocabulary all that it should be? Test yourself by the following list.

PLATONIST means (a) A man who thinks the universe is no place for an individual (b) A man with more than one girl-friend (c) Any philosopher with whom one disagrees.

EXISTENCE is (a) a predicate (b) the wherewith whereby the somewhat exists (c) drinking absinthe in black jeans.

A STOIC means (a) a tough guy (b) a special sort of ancient logician (c) any sort of modern logician.

NOBODY is (a) not the name of nobody (b) not the name of anybody (c) nobody's name.

CLASS-MEMBERSHIP is (a) a logical relation (b) a property of a non-proletarian (c) a number which decreases as term progresses.

NATURALISTIC FALLACY is (a) what you must not commit (b) any argument refuted by G.E. Moore (c) any argument proposed by G.E. Moore.

METAPHYSICS is (a) a rude word (b) an anthology compiled by W. Jaeger (c) the greater part of Wisdom.

TYPE means (a) a token of the type 'type' (typed) (b) what Russell's theory was a theory of (c) French word for a fellow-existentialist.

SUBSTANCE is (a) what Aristotle meant by *ousia* (b) what Aristotle meant by *ti esti* (c) what Aristotle meant by *hypokeimenon* (d) what did Aristotle mean anyway?

Many of our readers are on the brink of examinations. For them we offer in this issue a Test Paper, to remind them of the sort of tricks examiners get up to. Even those who do not manage to answer the test will find it useful, since we can reveal that none of the questions here set will appear in any examination to be held in the United Kingdom this year.

## Logic

(maximum speed: 15 mph)

Candidates should not attempt those questions they have already answered. Do not write on alternate lines.

- 1. Which more closely resembles the other, Russell or Hume?
- 2. What is to be said for the view that Aristotle wrote the Metaphysics backwards?
- 3. What is left over if I subtract the fact that my left arm goes up from the fact that my right arm stays down?
- 4. 'Man is primarily a fact'. Would another fact agree?
- 5. What is the difference between deferring and proscribing?
- 6. Have you had any good sensations?
- 7. In what sense are bachelors unmarried men?
- 8. 'I doubt whether this question is answerable'. Is this a philosophical doubt?
- 9. Do I fit my trousers, or do my trousers fit me?
- 10. 'Every boy loves some girl'. Does this help?
- 11. Why can my intelligence never be yours?
- 12. 'Wisdom is logically Prior'. Discuss.
- 13. Rewrite in the metalanguage: 'Unicorns pegasize pragmatically'. (Truth tables may be used.)

or

How many angels can sit on the edge of Occam's razor?

or

if p, then what?

C.A.K.

## If A Machine Tells You: 'I Shall Come Back To Finish Those Calculations For You', Then Goes Away And Does Not Return, Did It Break A Promise Or Did It Break Down?

Report on Why? Competition-Problem No. 3

There were two entries to this competition. One, from Oxford, declared in verse:

Your alternatives offered are not An at all contradictory lot Nor are they contrary— We urge you be wary: Your faithless machine just forgot!

We print here in full the entry submitted by A.J.K., of Bedford College, London:

But does a machine really tell you anything?!

Or, if a machine makes an utterance, is it an utterance or to be regarded as speech? If speech, is it supposed to be made directly by the machine or indirectly by its maker?

If it is made indirectly by the maker (by pushing buttons, etc.) then it is not the speech (or utterance) of the machine but the speech (not only utterance!) of the maker. If so, he can't say the sentence in question(a) because *he* is not going anywhere, b) because if you promise yourself something, you can't use the second person ('I shall finish those calculations for *you*'), therefore the sentence should either be rephrased or abandoned as twice meaningless.

Otherwise the problem depends on the relation between the above utterance and the Cogito. For only if the machine utters this proposition *after* declaring 'Sum ergo cogito' can it be meaningful speech. If the machine neglected first to establish its resemblance to the maker (see Gen. 1.26 and other metaphysicians) then it is not an independent actor, ergo non cogitat et quod sequitur non loquitur either.

These fundamentals established, the rest should be worked out by those concerned with moral technology.

(Remark. If you are a philosopher, you had better not mess about with machines anyhow.)

## Answers to Quiz

- 1. Pusey.
- 2. Whewell, in 1840.
- The Duke of Wellington, on being accosted with the words 'Mr Jones, I believe?' (Oxf. Dict. Quots., 564.22)
- Hume, Russell and Ayer. (H. in the 1760s; R. in 1894, see *Phil of B.R.*, page 10; A. in 1945, see *Who's Who*).
- 5. None, so far as I can discover. (But Dryden uses it: Oxf. Dict. Quots., 191.41)
- 6. Einstein. (Phil. of Albert Einstein, page 53.)
- 7. Moritz Schlick.
- 8. Peter of Spain became Pope John XXI (1276–77). (He chose *xxi*, although there had been no *xx*, because with true logicality he numbered Pope Joan among his predecessors.)
- 9. C.S. Peirce. (In The Monist, VII 1896, page 35.)
- 10. John Stuart Mill. (System of Logic, I.1.3, antepenultimate sentence.)
- 11. Science. (see Shorter Oxf. Dict., s.v. 'science', 5c.)
- 12. Socrates, Diderot, Russell.
- 13. Whitehead, on geometry. (see Russell in Mind 1948, page 138.)
- 14. In Aristotle's De Anima. (432a7)
- 15. Schopenhauer. (According to Prof. Erich Heller.)
- 16. Hegel, with reference to the Absolute.
- 17. Kant. (Critique of P.R., A656.)
- 18. Locke. (Essay, IV.15.5; Pringle-Pattison, page 336.)
- 19. Robert Musil.
- 20. Chrysippus. (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I.69.)

## Assessment

0: Normal (Plain Man). Up to 5: Contaminated. Up to 10: Well-informed. 10-20: Knowledgeable. 20-25: Your interest is obsessional. 25-30: Obviously a professional. 30-35: You read as others drink. 35-40: Learned. 40-50: Hopeless case of bibliomania. 50-55: Suspect. 55-60: Almost incredible. Above 60: You *must* have cheated.

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## **Review Article**

The Philosophy of Cookery

No one would today envisage the philosophy of cookery in Dr. Johnson's terms. Like other branches of philosophy in the XVIII century, it was very much influenced by the great progress made in natural sciences. Thus Dr. Johnson expressed his programme after a dinner in 1778: 'I could write a better book of cookery than has ever yet been written; it should be a book upon philosophical principles. Pharmacy is now made much more simple. Cookery may be made so too.' He intended to reduce the number of ingredients in the way the progress in pharmacy reduced ingredients in prescriptions. We all know since Language, Truth and Logic that this is a mistaken ideal for philosophy. The first impact of L.T.&L. on the philosophy of cookery was to make us regard recipes either as empirical statements or meaningless, except tautologies like 'water comes to the boiling point at 212°F.' This was a more radical break with tradition than the one expressed in Pr\*ch\*ard's article 'Does Cookery rest on a mistake?' Pr\*ch\*ard's point was that we cannot justify a recipe by reference to a good dinner. We have to consider all the ingredients and then intuit what to do. In cases of conflict it will turn out to be the case that we have not considered all the ingredients. This, however, does not solve problems discussed by R\*ss where there is a *prima facie* conflict between the ingredients themselves such as lemon juice and milk.

*L.T.*  $\mathscr{C}L$ . already indicated a new approach by regarding 'raw', 'spicy', etc. as emotive terms. This theme was taken up and developed by St\*v\*ns\*n in his 'Cookery and Language'. Recipes were translated into expressions of attitudes: 'I like my eggs boiled, do so as well' or 'I like to simmer it gently with the lid on, do so as well'.

One cannot do justice in a short review to Professor N-S.'s book on 'Cooking' which systematically deals with all major problems of the language we use for advising young housewives. The present reviewer is very much impressed by those passages where he comes down against Kantian cookery. Someone who cooks for the sake of cooking may do what a really good cook does, but he does not do it for the same motives. His value lies in the value of recipes, but recipes play a small part in the life of a real chef.

The notion of tautologies suggested partly by L.T. & L. played perhaps some influence on 'The Language of Cookery'. We cannot say that two pots of water are in exactly the same condition in every respect except that the one is boiling and the other is not boiling. 'Boiling' is a supervenient quality. With this book, the controversial issue of deductive cookery made its reappearance. There are no examples of cooking in the book except the consideration of sacking a cook. The book purports to be a neutral analysis of the logic of 'to cook', but nevertheless its views are incompatible with unprincipled French cooking.

It is related that at a Paris philosophical conference the chef burned a dish. One of the British philosophers reproached him by saying: 'But Sir, you don't understand the logic of the word 'to cook". Professor Br\*\*thw\*\*t\* is the other supporter of this view. He assures us moreover that recipes are stories to rouse our appetite. The statement 'food exists' means that 'I have a culinary attitude towards the world'.

No review of the philosophy of cookery is complete without mentioning Professor A\*st\*n's completely original approach to the problem. Instead of simply considering 'to cook', he investigates 'cook with', 'cook for', 'cook at' and 'cook up'. One must mention

his well-known lecture on the distinction between 'boiling and broiling'. We do say we embroil but we do not say we emboil. Another distinction that received his attention is that between larding and barding, and he paid much attention to the correct uses of such words as 'marinade', 'sauter' and 'flamber'.

He dislikes philosophers for taking as their examples hard, dry and solid objects, e.g. 'the table in front of me', or 'take a matchbox'. Obviously he prefers the language of a plain cook who says 'take two eggs'. 'But how do you separate two eggs? Do you separate two eggs as you separate two eggs when they are stuck together or as you separate two separate eggs? Do you do the same when you separate two potatoes as when you separate two eggs? You can separate *an* egg. Now separate *a* potato. Why cannot you separate a potato? We usually say that we *cut* a potato.'

Though a long way from Dr. Johnson, we cannot say that the Philosophy of Cookery is not alive today.

J.G.K.



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Proposed menu for the forthcoming dinner of the *Why*? Association. (Suggested places for this function include Maxim's, The Criterion, and The Berkeley.)

The dinner will be served on truth-tables.



E.J.K. drawn by N.L.K.



## About the Editor

(From a biographical fragment in the Kovesi archive)

Julius Kovesi was born at a very early age in Budapest. He gained admittance to kindergarten before becoming a Reader in elementary school. He travelled extensively round Lake Balaton. By leaving Hungary he became alienated until he became naturalised in Australia. Consequently, he became an expert on Alienation and on Nature. He is the only expert on Hungarian Philosophy, having invented it for an Encyclopedia.